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Summary
The Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP) in the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has been developing and maintaining a National Asset Database.
The Database contains information on over 77,000 individual assets, ranging from
dams, hazardous materials sites, and nuclear power plants to local festivals, petting
zoos, and sporting good stores.  The presence of a large number of entries of the
latter type (i.e. assets generally perceived as having more local importance than
national importance) has attracted much criticism from the press and from Members
of Congress.  Many critics of the Database have assumed that it is (or should be)
DHS’s list of the nation’s most critical assets and are concerned that, in its current
form, it is being used inappropriately as the basis upon which federal resources,
including infrastructure protection grants, are allocated.
According to DHS, both of those assumptions are wrong.  DHS characterizes
the National Asset Database not as a list of critical assets, but rather as a national
asset inventory providing the ‘universe’ from which various lists of critical assets are
produced.  As such, the Department maintains that it represents just the first step in
DHS’s risk management process outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan.  DHS has developed, apparently from the National Asset Database, a list of
about 600 assets that it has determined are critical to the nation.   Also, while the
National Asset Database has been used to support federal grant-making decisions,
according to a DHS official, it does not drive those decisions.
In July 2006 the DHS Office of the Inspector General released a report on the
National Asset Database.  Its primary conclusion was that the Database contained too
many unusual and out-of-place assets and recommended that those judged to be of
little national significance be removed from the Database.  In his written response to
the DHS IG report, the Undersecretary of DHS did not concur with this
recommendation, asserting that keeping these less than nationally significant assets
in the Database gave it a situational awareness that will assist in preparing and
responding to a variety of incidents.  
Accepting the DHS descriptions of the National Asset Database, questions and
issues remain.  For example, the National Asset Database seems to have evolved
away from its origins as a list of critical infrastructures, perhaps causing the
differences in perspective on what the Database is or should be.  As an inventory of
the nation’s assets, the National Asset Database is incomplete, limiting its value in
preparing and responding to a wide variety of incidents.  Assuring the quality of the
information in the Database is important and a never-ending task.  If DHS not only
keeps the less than nationally significant assets in the Database but adds more of
them to make the inventory complete, assuring the quality of the data on these assets
may dominate the cost of maintaining the Database, while providing uncertain value.
Finally, the information currently contained in the Database carries with it no legal
obligations on the owner/operators of the asset.  If, however, the Database becomes
the basis for regulatory action in the future, what appears in the Database takes on
more immediate consequences for both DHS and the owner/operators.
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Critical Infrastructure: The National Asset
Database
Introduction
The Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP) in the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has been developing and maintaining a National Asset Database.
The Database contains information on a wide range of individual assets, from dams,
hazardous materials sites, and nuclear power plants to local festivals, petting zoos,
and sporting good stores.  The presence of a large number of entries of the latter type
(i.e. assets generally perceived as having more local importance than national
importance) has attracted much criticism from the press and from Members of
Congress.  Many critics of the Database have assumed that it is (or should be) DHS’s
list of the nation’s most critical assets and are concerned that, in its current form, it
is being used inappropriately as the basis upon which federal resources, including
infrastructure protection grants, are allocated.  According to DHS, both of those
assumptions are wrong.
The purpose of this report is to discuss the National Asset Database: what is in
it, how it is populated, what the Database apparently is, what it is not, and how it is
intended to be used.  The report also discusses some of the issues on which Congress
could focus its oversight, including appropriation bill language.  This report relies
primarily on a DHS Office of the Inspector General (DHS IG) report,1 released on
July 11, 2006, but makes reference to other government documents as well.
A Short Review of the DHS IG Report
The genesis of the National Asset Database remains somewhat unclear.  A list
of critical sites was begun in the spring of 2003 as part of Operation Liberty Shield.2
The list contained 160 assets, including chemical and hazardous materials sites,
nuclear plants, energy facilities, business and finance centers, and more.  The assets
were selected by the newly formed Protective Services Division (now called the Risk
Management Division) within the Office of Infrastructure Protection, Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, Department of Homeland
CRS-2
3 DHS offered assistance to help protect these sites through its Buffer Zone Protection Plan
program.  At times the State Homeland Security grants could be used to help pay for
overtime of law enforcement officials and National Guardsmen protecting critical sites. 
4 According to testimony by the then Undersecretary for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection, a list of 1,700 assets (according to the DHS IG report the actual
number was 1,849) was culled from the larger list.  However, the DHS IG report implied
that the Protected Measures Target List grew independently, to which was added additional
information from the states and other sources, leading to a combined list of 28,368 assets,
which then grew into the National Asset Database.
5 In June 2004, the House Appropriations Committee made reference to a Unified National
Database of Critical Infrastructure, described as a master database of all existing critical
infrastructures in the country.  See, U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2005. H.Rept. 108-541. p. 92.  The comparable
Senate Appropriations Committee report (S.Rept. 108-280) made reference to a National
Asset Database.   The budget request for FY2005 mentions the development of a primary
database of the nations critical infrastructure, but gave it no name.
6 The statutory definition of critical infrastructure is given in the USA PATRIOT Act
(P.L.107-56).  It is: “...systems and assets...so vital to the United States that the incapacity
or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security,
national economic security, national public health and safety, or any combination of those
matters.”  There are currently 12 sectors of the economy and 5 groups of key resources
(dams, commercial assets, government facilities, national monuments, nuclear facilities) that
DHS considers as possessing systems or assets that, if lost, may have a critical impact on the
United States.
Security.  The Secretary of DHS asked states to provide additional security for these
sites.3  
During the course of the year (2003), DHS continued to collect information on
various assets from a variety of sources.  By early 2004, DHS had accumulated
information on 28,368 assets.  Although Operation Liberty Shield was now
considered over, the initial list of 160 critical assets, those judged to be in need of
additional protection because of their vulnerability and the potential consequences
if attacked, grew to 1,849 assets and became known as the Protected Measures Target
List.4   It is not clear when the information being gathered became known as the
National Asset Database.5
By January 2006, according to the DHS IG report, the Database had grown to
include 77,069 assets, ranging from nuclear power plants and dams to a casket
company and an elevator company.  It also contains locations and events ranging
from Times Square in New York City to the Mule Day Parade in Columbia
Tennessee (which, according to the city’s website, draws over 200,000 spectators
each year for the week-long event).
The IG report categorized entries by critical infrastructure/key resource sector
(see Figure 1).6  Additionally, the DHS IG report identified some of the entries with
more specificity.  For example, the Database contains 4,055 malls, shopping centers,
and retail outlets; 224 racetracks; 539 theme parks and 163 water parks; 1,305
casinos; 234 retails stores; 514 religious meeting places; 127 gas stations; 130
CRS-3
7 Department of Homeland Security. National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Released June
30, 2006. See, [http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NIPP_Plan.pdf].  
8 According to the DHS IG report, examples of existing government databases that have
contributed to the National Asset Database include the Chemical Sites List (an
Environmental Protection Agency database), and the Government Services Administration
list of GSA Buildings.
libraries; 4,164 educational facilities; 217 railroad bridges; and 335 petroleum
pipelines. 
Source: Office of the Inspector General. Department of Homeland Security. Taken from
Progress in Developing the National Asset Database.
The DHS gets information for the Database from a variety of sources.
According to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)7, sources include
existing government and commercially-available databases;8 sector-specific agencies
and other federal entities; voluntary submittals by owners and operators; periodic
requests for information from states and localities and the private sector; and DHS-
initiated studies.  The number of assets in the Database is expected to grow as
additional information is gathered.  
The DHS IG report focused much of its attention on information provided by
states and localities as the result of two data requests made by DHS.  According to
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Figure 1. National Asset Database Entries by Sector
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9 Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General. Op. Cit. p. 11.  The
Office of Domestic Preparedness is now called Grants and Training and has been merged
into the Preparedness Directorate along with the Office of Infrastructure Protection.
Referred to as ODP throughout this report, it manages the majority of grants to states and
localities for homeland security and critical infrastructure protection. 
10 Ibid p. 8.
11 Ibid p. 8.  This is similar language used in ODP’s Urban Areas Security Initiative grants.
12 Ibid. p. 12.
13 The collection of personal information in the Database requires DHS to publish a Privacy
Impact Assessment.  That Assessment can be found at
 [http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/privacy_pia_nadb.pdf].  A discussion of the
Assessment is beyond the scope of this report.
14 Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General. Op. cit. p. 6. 
15 According to the DHS IG report, the Database contains 11,018 entries identified as
nationally significant, 32,631 identified as not considered nationally significant, and 33,419
whose significance are undetermined.
According to the IG report, the first data call to the states, made by the Office
of Domestic Preparedness in 2003, yielded poor quality data.9  The IG report
described the guidance given states and localities as “minimal.”10  The guidance
apparently did tell states, however, to “consider any system or asset that, if attacked,
would result in catastrophic loss of life and/or catastrophic economic loss.”11  As a
result, assets such as the petting zoos, local festivals and other places where people
within a community congregate, or local assets ostensibly belonging to one of the
critical infrastructure sectors, were among the assets reported.  According to the IG
report, many state officials were surprised to learn that additional assets from their
states were added to the Database, which raises additional questions about how the
information was collected.
According to the IG report, the second request to the states for critical
infrastructure information came from the Office of Infrastructure Protection in July
2004 and was “significantly more organized and achieved better results.”12  Guidance
was more specific, as was the information requested.  DHS requested information for
17 data fields. Of those, DHS considered the following to be most important:
address, owner, owner type, phone, local law enforcement point of contact, and
latitude and longitude coordinates.13  States were also asked to identify those assets
that they felt met a level of national significance.  Criteria for identifying assets of
national significance was provided by DHS.  The criteria described certain
thresholds, such as refineries with refining capacity in excess of 225,000 barrels per
day, or commercial centers with potential economic loss impact of $10 billion or
capacity of more than 35,000 people.  Although the request was more specific, states
were given much leeway as to what to include, and OIP accepted into the Database
every submitted asset.14  As a result, additional assets of questionable national
significance were added to the Database.15
 
The DHS IG report drew two primary conclusions.  The first is that the Database
contains many “unusual, or out-of-place, assets whose criticality is not readily
CRS-5
16 Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General. Op. cit. p. 9.
17 Ibid p. 18.
18 Other examples of what the DHS IG considered to be inconsistent were: some states listed
schools for their sheltering function, some did not; Indiana listed over 8,000 assets, more
than states larger in area and population like New York, Texas, and California; and, fewer
banking and finance centers are listed for New York than North Dakota. 
19 Office of Homeland Security. National Strategy for Homeland Security. July 2002. p. 30.
20 White House. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets. February 2003. p. 23.
apparent,”16 while, at the same time, it “may have too few assets in essential areas
and may present an incomplete picture.”17  The second conclusion was that the types
of assets that were included and the information provided are inconsistent from state
to state, locality to locality.  For example, California entries include the entire Bay
Area Regional Transit System as a single entry, while entries listed for New York
City include 739 separate subway stations.18
The IG report made 4 recommendations: 
! review the National Asset Database for out-of-place assets and assets
marked as not nationally significant, and determine whether those
assets should remain in the Database;
! provide state homeland security advisers the opportunity to review
their assets in the Database to identify previously submitted assets
that may not be relevant;
! during future data calls, provide States a list of their respective
Database assets to reduce the ... duplicate submissions; and
! establish a milestone for the completion of a comprehensive risk
assessment of critical infrastructure and key resources and ensure
they are accurately captured in the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan.
   
The National Asset Database: What It Is and What It Is Not
The National Strategy for Homeland Security recognized that not all assets
within each critical infrastructure sector are equally important, and that the federal
government would focus its effort on the highest priorities.19  The National Strategy
for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets stated that DHS
will develop a methodology for identifying assets with national-level criticality and
using this methodology will build a comprehensive database to catalog these critical
assets.20  Judging from the criticism leveled at it, many believe the National Asset
Database is (or should be) DHS’s list of assets critical to the nation.
However, in his written response to the IG report, the Undersecretary for
Preparedness, George Foresman, to whom the Office of Infrastructure Protection
reports, stated that the National Asset Database is “not a list of critical assets...[but
rather] a national asset inventory...[providing] the ‘universe’ from which various lists
CRS-6
21 Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General. Op. cit. p. 29.
22 Department of Homeland Security. National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Op. cit.
pg159. 
23 See USA Today, “Database is Just the 1st Step,” by Robert Stephan. July 21, 2006. p. 8A.
24 See Congressional Quarterly’s internet publication, CQ Homeland Security, July 29, 2004,
at [http://homeland.cq.com/hs/display.do?docid=1278697&sourcetype=31], last viewed
September 12, 2006.
25 USA Today. Op. cit.
of critical assets are produced.”21  According to the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, the National Asset Database is a comprehensive catalog with descriptive
information regarding the assets and systems that comprise the nation’s critical
infrastructure and key resources.22  The Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure
Protection, Robert Stephan, has called the Database a ‘phonebook’ of 77,000
facilities, assets and systems from across the nation, needed to facilitate more
detailed risk analyses.23  
Some may ask why there should be this difference in perception regarding the
National Asset Database.  One possible explanation is that, as noted above, the
National Asset Database started out as the Protected Measures Target List, which was
a prioritized list of assets considered critical at the national level.  Also, as reported
in at least one media source, when asked for its list of critical assets, Members of
Congress were shown the expanded list containing the questionable assets.24  Based
on subsequent response, Congressional interest appears focused on a prioritized list.
Also, what is meant by the term “critical infrastructure” continues to generate
some confusion.  The definition provided in the USA PATRIOT Act and in other
policy documents refers to specific assets or systems within a selected set of sectors
or categories.  However, the term also is used often to identify the sectors and
categories themselves.  For example, the transportation sector is often called a critical
infrastructure, when, according to the statutory definition, only those assets within
the transportation sector  whose loss would be debilitating to the nation should be
called critical infrastructure.  Given the varied usage of the term critical
infrastructure, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan description of the National
Asset Database above, is unclear.  Is it a list of assets that are critical, or is it a list of
assets that make up each of the critical sectors, with criticality to be determined later?
What Are Its Intended Uses?
There appear to be two primary uses for the Database: as a first step in a
prioritization process that eventually will help focus risk reduction activities; and, to
provide a degree of situational awareness.  According to Assistant Secretary Stephan,
the Database “does not drive the Department’s funding decisions.”25
First Step In Identifying Critical Assets and Prioritizing Risk
Reduction Activities.  Taking an inventory of one’s assets is a standard first step
CRS-7
26 For a discussion on common basic elements of a risk management process, in the context
of critical infrastructure protection, see CRS Report RL32561. Risk Management and
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Assessing, Integrating, and Managing Threat,
Vulnerability, and Consequences, by John Moteff.
27 As mentioned above, in the second data request to the states, DHS provided some
characteristic thresholds by which DHS may assess whether or not an asset is critical at the
national level.  Also, according to the NIPP, as the various sectors work with their Sector
Specific Agencies to develop sector-level protection plans, another source of information
for the Database, owners/operators will have a standard form containing a few questions that
can assist in determining criticality.
28 Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General. Op. cit. p. 10.
29 It is not clear how this list of about 600 assets compares with the earlier Protective
Measures Target List.  Presumably, the list is a subset of the 77,069 assets in the Database
and not a parallel list, but that is not clear either.
for most risk management processes used to prioritize the protection of those assets.26
The second step is to screen this initial list for those assets considered critical to the
organization (or country) using specific criteria.  Further analysis is focused on these
critical assets.  The National Infrastructure Protection Plan establishes DHS’s risk
management process.  According to the NIPP, identifying the assets that comprise the
nation’s 17 critical infrastructure sectors and key resources within the National Asset
Database represents the first step in its process.
As envisioned by the NIPP, DHS will then select those assets from the Database
it considers critical to the nation as a whole.27  If the asset is judged not to be critical
from a national perspective, DHS does not require any further information.  If the
asset does have the potential to be critical, DHS will ask for more information, which
includes information that will support further risk and risk mitigation analysis (e.g.
vulnerability to specific forms of attack or natural disasters and more detailed
analysis of the consequences associated with the loss of the asset, including
interdependencies with other assets).  Vulnerability, consequences, and threat
information then will be integrated to yield a risk score.  According to the NIPP,
those assets that pose the greatest risk are further analyzed to identify potential risk
reduction initiatives, which are then prioritized (i.e. the risk reduction initiatives)
based on their cost-effectiveness.  Presumably, as additional analysis and information
is generated for a particular asset, it will be added, or linked, to the Database.
According to the IG report, DHS officials acknowledge that many of the assets
currently in the Database “will never be analyzed in depth or used to support any
program activity.”28
According to the Assistant Secretary, DHS has identified about 600 assets that
it considers to be critical to the nation, based on its analysis of vulnerability to attack
or natural events and the possible consequences.29  This list is apparently prioritized
CRS-8
30 See, ABC News Internet Ventures, Government Confirms Much Shorter List of Critical
U.S. Locations, at [http://www.abcnews.go.com/GMA/print?id=2218846]. Site last viewed
August 30, 2006.
31 USA Today. Op. cit.
32 Gas stations of any size or location are not listed in the criteria of what DHS considers to
be a nationally significant asset within the oil and gas sector or any other sector or key
resource category.   
33 Neither DHS or the IG report use the term “situational awareness” to describe the
activities discussed in this section.  This is a term CRS believes captures the breadth of the
statements made regarding this particular use of the Database.
34 Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General. Op. cit. p. 29.
35 Department of Homeland Security. National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Op. cit. p.
32.
further.30  The Assistant Secretary asserted that this shorter list does not contain
petting zoos, popcorn factories or other such facilities.31
While it may be common practice to take an initial inventory of one’s assets as
a first step in a risk management process, detailed information on individual assets
is not necessarily needed to determine their criticality.  The presence of gas stations
listed in the National Asset Database is a case in point.
Gas stations could be considered a part of the oil and gas infrastructure, a
subsector of the energy sector.  In assessing the oil and gas infrastructure, one may
want to identify, in general, all the assets that make up that infrastructure from
production fields, to refineries, to distribution, and all the transport elements in
between.  Gas stations would be on that list, at the very end of the distribution chain.
In determining which assets are the most critical, one does not need specific
information on individual gas stations to determine that the loss of any individual gas
station would have a minimal effect on the distribution of gasoline throughout the
country, or on the economy, or national public health, beyond the immediate vicinity
of the gas station itself.  Yet the National Asset Database contains 127 gas stations.
Unless these 127 specific gas stations have some unique characteristics (perhaps
being located next to an identified critical asset which could be damaged if there
were a loss of the gas station), maintaining specific information on those gas stations
seems unnecessary to determine their criticality.32      
Situational Awareness.  DHS justifies keeping assets that have not been
judged as being critical at the national level in the Database as a way to provide a
degree of situational awareness.33
 
Undersecretary Foresman noted in his response to the IG report that, “Many
assets not ‘critical’ are, in fact, critical depending upon the circumstances....”34  For
example, as noted in the NIPP, “...the information may be used to quickly identify
those assets...that may be the subject of emergent terrorist statements or interest or
that may be located in the areas of greatest impact from natural disasters.”35
According to the NIPP, having this information (apparently regardless of the
criticality level of the asset) will help inform decisions made regarding preparedness,
CRS-9
36 It is not clear how, or if, the Database was used to inform preparedness and response
decisions made during the hurricanes of 2005. 
37 The Washington Post. “U.S. Struggles to Rank Potential Terror Targets. Securing All Sites
Not Financially Feasible, but Choices Are Fraught With Uncertainty,” by Spencer Hsu. July
16, 2006. p. A9.
38 The IP/IS program supports much of the Department’s critical infrastructure protection
activities, including its coordinating responsibilities, the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program, etc.  It is one of the
Preparedness Directorate’s Budget Activities.
39 For example, the FY2007 budget justification discussed a program called Constellation,
an automated critical asset management system, which would allow law enforcement to
inventory, categorize, prioritize, and database critical assets.  It also includes a risk
assessment system, compatible with the National Asset Database, and allows for automated
BZPP development.  Data flow from the Constellation pilot program (in Los Angeles) to
National Asset Database is to be initiated in FY2006.  In FY2007 the program will be
expanded to other cities and information integrated with the National Asset Database.
40 Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General. Op. cit. p. 31.
response, and recovery to a wide range of incidents and emergencies.36  In defense
of the contents of the National Asset Database, the Assistant Secretary is quoted as
saying: “What happens the very first day that al-Qaeda attacks a convenience store
chain times a dozen across the country?...we better have some of those things in the
database so that we know what that universe of things is that we have to worry
about.”37  
According to the FY2007 Congressional Budget Justification for the
Infrastructure Protection and Information Security (IP/IS) Program,38 the Database
will deliver something called the Risk/Readiness Dashboard to DHS management.
The budget justification identified the Risk/Readiness Dashboard as a planning and
management tool that will eventually fuse threat streams with critical infrastructure
vulnerability information and consequences, and will visually present a risk profile
for critical infrastructure assets.  According to the budget justification, such a
capability will provide real-time knowledge that can be used to support rapid
decision-making during periods of heightened threats.  
Also, while a particular asset may not be critical at the national level, it may still
be critical at the state or local level.  Since DHS plans to allow many stakeholders
eventually (with appropriate clearances) to have selected access to the Database, and
the information in it or linked to it, the Database represents a common picture (i.e.
a standard format and taxonomy) for all to use.39  Also, according to the
Undersecretary, DHS does not support purging the Database of these non-nationally
critical assets, because it is important to the Department to be informed about what
is important to the states and localities.40  
The statements above raise a number of issues.  First, that assets may be critical
under some circumstances and not others, or become critical because they have been
identified by intelligence as possible targets, seems to conflict with the statutory
definition of critical infrastructures.  Under the conditions stated above, just about
any asset could be considered critical and setting and implementing priorities would
CRS-10
41 National Petroleum News. “Market Facts: Mid-July 2006. 2006 NPN Station Count.” p.
98.
42 White House. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets. Op. Cit. p. 9.
43 Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General. Op. cit. p. 12.
become even more complicated than it is now.  Many would expect DHS to respond
to such intelligence as part of its counter-terrorism efforts, which might include
quickly deploying critical infrastructure resources such as sending out vulnerability
assessment teams and establishing buffer zone protection plans.  However, such
efforts seem to lie beyond the fundamental goal of the critical infrastructure
protection program, which is to identify those assets most critical to the nation as a
whole.
Also, if the National Asset Database is meant to be a comprehensive list of the
nation’s infrastructure assets, regardless of criticality, it is incomplete.  As noted in
the previous section, only 127 gas stations are in the Database.  There are over
167,000 gas stations in the United States.41  Similarly, the Database contains only 140
defense industrial base assets, 417 postal and shipping sites, 669 banking and
financial assets, and 7,542 agriculture and food assets.  According to the National
Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, DHS
estimated that there are 250,000 defense industrial firms, 137 million postal and
shipping delivery sites, 26,600 FDIC insured institutions, and almost 2 million farms
and 87,000 food processing plants.42  To identify only a few a these assets, perhaps
in some states, but not in others, limits the utility of the current National Asset
Database to support situational awareness to those relatively few instances where the
Database may have the appropriate information. 
The position that the National Asset Database holds data on those assets that
states and localities have identified as important to them is contradicted by the DHS
IG report.  According to the report, state officials were repeatedly surprised to learn
about the assets that were added as part of the ODP data call and which remain in the
Database.43  The Database includes many assets not selected by the states. 
      
Basis for Allocating Critical Infrastructure Protection Grants.  The
role that the National Asset Database plays in allocating federal resources to states
and localities for infrastructure protection is of obvious interest to Congress.  In
FY2006, allocations of Urban Area Security Initiative grants saw some significant
changes based on new risk calculations by the DHS.  A number of cities saw their
grant levels drop.  Some Members believe that allocations were based on what they
consider to be a flawed National Asset Database.
Over the last two grant cycles, according to the DHS IG report, ODP has made
increased use of information in the National Asset Database to support its allocation
of various critical infrastructure protection grants to states and localities.  However,
according to the Assistant Secretary, the National Asset Database does not drive
DHS’s funding decisions.  The exception is the Buffer Zone Protection Plan grants,
CRS-11
44 See, Department of Homeland Security. Office of Grants and Training. Discussion of the
FY2006 Risk Methodology and the Urban Area Security Initiative located at
[http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/FY_2006_UASI_Program_Explanation_Paper_011
805.doc], last viewed on August 31, 2006. 
45 Based on personal communication with industry official, September 29, 2003.
46 Quoted by CQ Homeland Security. Op. cit.    
47 Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General. Op. cit. p. 16.
which were initiated to support the protection efforts associated with the original
Protected Measures Target List and Operation Liberty Shield.
The relationship between the ODP’s grant-making process, the National Asset
Database, and the NIPP is not explicitly stated in DHS documents.  The NIPP risk
assessment process was finalized June 30, 2006, but ODP has had some form of risk
assessment process in place for determining initial grant allocations for programs
such as the Urban Area Security Initiative since 2003.  Also, for the FY2006 cycle,
ODP indicates it had evaluated over 120,000 specific infrastructure assets,44 but the
National Asset Database only contains 77,069 assets.  It would appear that ODP’s
grant-making process operates independently from both the National Asset Database
and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
Issues
Assuming that the Undersecretary is not changing the definition of critical
infrastructure, and accepting DHS’s argument that the National Asset Database is not
a prioritized list of critical assets, and that it is not the basis for determining grant
allocations, two issues remain: the quality of the information contained in the
Database; and, whether the value of keeping low criticality assets in the Database
warrant the costs associated with maintaining them in the Database.  Another
potential issue could arise if the current voluntary nature of the Database changes.
Congress may ultimately focus its oversight of the National Asset Database on these
areas. 
Quality. Data quality is always an issue in generating any database.  In the case
of the National Asset Database, quality includes accuracy, consistency, and
completeness.  The quality of the information gathered early in the development of
the Database has been questioned.  For example, early in the evolution of the list,
certain electric utility operators were presented with a list of critical electric power
assets drawn up by DHS and noticed that some of the entries were not currently in
use.45  Also, one Member of Congress noted that the location for Disneyland was
incorrect.46  According to the IG report, DHS itself determined that the early
Protected Measures Target List was unreliable.47
DHS has taken a number of steps to improve the quality of the information
contained in the Database.  The IG report noted that during the second data call to the
states, DHS hired contractors to put the information it received into a consistent
format, to research missing information, and to verify the accuracy of the
information.  DHS has approved a taxonomy which everyone submitting information
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49 The Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program implements the Critical
Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, passed as part of the Homeland Security Act, P.L.
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can use to categorize and subcategorize assets.  DHS plans to use this taxonomy in
future data calls.  The IG report also stated that DHS intends to use expert panels to
review information in their sector of expertise.  According the FY2007 budget
justification, one of the responsibilities of the Protective Security Advisors48 is to
verify critical infrastructure information.
Of particular concern is the completeness of the information included.  Beyond
the issue that there appears to be an incomplete inventory of the less than critical
assets, as noted above, the IG was particularly concerned that the Database does not
include assets that one might conclude should be included.  The IG attributed part of
this problem to reluctance on the part of private sector owner/operators to share
certain information with DHS, nothwithstanding the Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information Program.49
Insuring the quality of the information in the Database is likely to require a
continuous effort, since quality also implies currency.  If a particular site closes,
moves, or changes ownership, the changes would logically need to be captured in the
Database.
The consideration of quality could include also the accessibility, flexibility, and
security of the database. The NIPP suggested that the Database would be accessible
to many type of queries, by many types of stakeholders.  However, it is not clear that
the Database yet has these capabilities.  DHS intends to develop a second generation
Database, one that includes the integration of vulnerability, risk, threat, and other
relevant information.  According to the IG report, DHS does not expect the second
generation Database to be ready for two more years.  In regard to security, the
Undersecretary, in his response to the IG report, asserted that the Database currently
“exceeds all security and protection standards.”50  Assessing the accuracy of this
assertion is beyond the scope of this report.
What to Keep.  The IG report asserted that maintaining unusual and out-of-
place entries in the Database may:    
! complicate efforts to develop a useful database;
! make resource allocation more challenging;
! obscure desired data;
! waste time and money in repeatedly filtering them out of analyses or
trying to prioritize them; and 
! taint credibility.
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justification all make reference to a “national risk profile.”  The NIPP describes the national
risk profile as a high level summary of the aggregate risk and protective status across all
sectors.  The IG report makes reference to a contractor developed Gross Consequences of
Attack tool that would automatically estimate, across a large number of potential targets
held in the Database, the consequences associated with various types of attacks.  It is not
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52 U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Making Appropriations for the Department of
Homeland Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2006, and for Other Purposes.
H.Rept. 109-241, accompanying H.R. 2360. p. 71.
The DHS IG report, however, does not explain how these entries would
necessarily complicate, challenge, and obscure efforts.  While the Database may not
yet be as accessible or as searchable as eventually planned, it is not clear why less
critical (or more critical) data could not be tagged as such.  However, the presence
of this data does involve cost in time and resources.  At the very least, as discussed
above, the information collected on all assets must be entered and verified (even the
less critical ones) and  missing data also may have to be located.  Also, additional
costs would likely be incurred if any further analysis (such as vulnerability
assessment or more detailed consequence analysis) were done on these entries.51  The
budget justification documents do not present data on how much money DHS spends
on the Database, or how that expense is broken down.  However, Congress did
appropriate $20 million for the Database in FY2006.52
While the argument could be made that the costs might be marginal, the DHS
IG report noted that, currently, those entries identified as not being critical at the
national level outnumber, by 3 to 1, those that are identified as critical at the national
level.  Currently, DHS considers only 600 assets as being the most critical, indicating
that less than critical sites could actually dominate the cost of maintaining the
Database.
It is not clear how to evaluate the value of maintaining these non-critical assets
in the Database, especially if their numbers are under-represented and the risk
associated with them is relatively low.  
A Potential Change in Status for the Database.  Currently the presence
of a particular asset in the Database carries with it no specific obligations on the part
of the owner/operator.  They are not required by statute or regulation to provide
information to the Database or to take any specific actions as a result of having an
asset listed.  Information solicited by DHS is voluntarily given.  Presumably, publicly
available information does not require the permission of the owner/operator for it to
be included in the Database.  However, if ever having an asset on the National Asset
Database carries with it some legal or regulatory requirements, then what is in and
not in the Database, or adding or removing assets from it, might result in much
greater consequences for both the owners/operators and DHS.      
Congressional Action.  In its version of the Department of Homeland
Security FY2007 appropriation bill, H.R. 5441 (passed on July 17, 2006), the Senate
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approved a floor amendment to require the Secretary of DHS to submit a report on
efforts to comply with recommendations made in the July 2006 Inspector General
(IG) report.  Another amendment passed on the Senate floor forbids the use of certain
funds for travel by officers of the Department, until the Undersecretary for
Preparedness has implemented the recommendations or reported to Congress on why
the recommendations have not been fully implemented.  The House version of H.R.
5441, which the House approved on June 6, 2006, does not have comparable
language.
